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Abstract
A companion paper [2] has defined the notion of digital social contracts,
illustrated how a social-contracts programming language might look like,
and demonstrated its potential utility via example social contracts. The
abstract model retains the distributed and asynchronous reality of social
contracts, in which people have genuine identifiers, which are unique and
singular cryptographic key pairs, and operate software agents thus iden-
tified on their mobile device. It consists of a transition system specify-
ing concurrent, non-deterministic asynchronous agents engaged in crypto-
speech acts, which are cryptographically-signed sequentially-indexed dig-
ital actions. Here, we address the distributed implementation of digital
social contracts in the presence of faulty agents: we present a design of
a fault-tolerant distributed transition system for digital social contracts,
show that it indeed implements the abstract notion of digital social con-
tracts, and discuss its resilience to faulty agents.
Typically, overcoming faulty parties requires the non-faulty parties
to reach consensus. Reaching consensus for digital social contracts is
similar to Byzantine Agreement, in that the parties to the agreement
are known (or “permissioned”); but is simpler, since the asynchronous
nature of digital social contracts requires only consensus about the past,
not about the present state of affairs. As such, it is similar to Nakamoto
consensus; but it is also simpler than it in several respects: (i) it is among
known (“permissioned”) parties (ii) history is partially ordered; no need
to agree on a total order (iii) no need to choose among conflicting actions
(“double-spend”); both may be abandoned, as well as any subsequent
actions of the faulty party. These weaker requirements result in a simpler
fault-tolerant protocol, described herein.
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1 Introduction
Our goal in this paper is to describe a fault-tolerant distributed implementation
of digital social contracts, as described in a recent paper [2]. To do so, we first
recall from [2] the definition of digital social contracts as abstract transition
systems. Then, we:
1. Define a fault-tolerant distributed transition system for digital social con-
tracts;
2. Define a notion of implementation among transition systems;
3. Prove that, indeed, our fault-tolerant distributed transition system of a
digital social contract implements correctly its abstract transition system,
even in the presence of a bounded fraction of faulty (Byzantine) agents.
We especially focus on how our implementation handles double-acts (with
double-spends being a special case).
1.1 What are Digital Social Contracts?
We refer to [2] for the definition and motivation for digital social contracts. In
essence, digital social contracts are a voluntary agreement between people that
is specified, undertaken, and fulfilled in the digital realm. It embodies the notion
of “code-is-law” in its purest form, in that a digital social contract is in fact a
program – code in a social contracts programming language, which specifies the
digital actions parties to the social contract may take; and the parties to the
contract are entrusted, equally, with the task of ensuring that each party abides
by the contract. Parties to a social contract are identified via their public keys,
and the one and only type of action a party to a digital social contract may
take is a “crypto-speech act” – signing an utterance with her private key and
sending it to the other parties to the contract.
In [2], the applicability of digital social contracts is demonstrated, by writing
programs for key application areas, including social community; simple sharing-
economy applications; egalitarian currency networks; and democratic commu-
nity governance. Possible extensions, described in companion papers, include
autonomous deterministic agents akin to “smart contracts”, and joint agents
executed jointly by several parties to the contract; a definition of a distributed
implementation of digital social contracts in the presence of faulty agents; and
egalitarian and just currency networks, suitable for realization via a network of
digital social contracts.
In Section 3 we recall the definitions of their abstract model of computation,
for which we focus on implementation here.
1.2 Related Work
A fundamental tenet of our design is that social agreements are made between
people who know and trust each other, directly or indirectly via other people
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that they know and trust. This is in stark contrast to the design of cryptocur-
rencies and their associated smart contracts, which are made between anony-
mous and trustless accounts. A challenge that cryptocurrencies address is how
to achieve consensus in the absence of trust, and their solution is based on
proof-of-work [4] or, more recently, proof-of-stake [9] protocols. In contrast,
social contracts are between known and trustworthy individuals, each expected
to posses a genuine (unique and singular) identifier [11] (see therein discussion
on how this can be ensured). Hence, a different approach can be taken. In our
approach, the integrity of the record of actions taken by the parties to the social
agreement is reached between parties to the agreement, not between external
anonymous “miners”, as in cryptocurrencies. This gives rise to a much simpler
approach to fault tolerance.
In particular, our approach does not suffer from forks/delayed finality as
for example the Bitcoin protocol [8], and does not need to reach Byzantine
Agreement [7]. Instead, agents ratify actions of each other, an action is decided
to be final when it is known that a supermajority of the agents ratify it, and
agents take an action that depends on actions of others only once they are
decided to be final. As a result, the handling of “double spend”, a key challenge
for cryptocurrencies, is much simpler.
Hence, rather than building on an existing blockchain architecture, we pro-
pose here a new one. Digital social contracts are (also) an abstract model of
computation, and as such could be implemented on any Turing-complete compu-
tational model, in particular on a single centralized computer, on a client-server
system, as a software-as-a-service application, as a smart contract on a pub-
lic (permissionless) blockchain, or on a permissioned blockchain. Digital social
contracts aim to support digital communities that are both sovereign and egal-
itarian: sovereign over their membership and conduct, and egalitarian in exer-
cising their sovereignty. Open peer-to-peer systems, e.g., Scuttlebut [12], do not
exercise sovereignty over membership; federated systems, e.g.. Mastodon [10],
do not exercise egalitarian governance, in that each server operator has full con-
trol over the community residing on its server. Equality without sovereignty is
easily achieved, in principle, among the clients in a client-server architecture.
But democratic governance of a system is impossible if the members are not
the sovereign, as any decision they make can ultimately be overruled by the
sovereign, who can simply unplug/erase/block the community. Blockchain is
the first technology to offer sovereignty to its participants: Nobody can unplug
Bitcoin or Ethereum, for example; both will keep running as long as someone
somewhere keeps running their protocols. However, present public (permission-
less) blockchains are not a feasible vehicle for smart contracts, for several rea-
sons. First, their Proof-of-Work protocol is environmentally harmful, and hence
cannot be supported by any person of conscience, let alone an effort aiming at
a just society. Second, they, as well as novel environmentally-friendly consensus
protocols [9, 5], are plutocratic, providing more power and more wealth to those
who are already wealthy; hence they are neither egalitarian nor just. Stan-
dard private (permissioned) dedicated blockchains can address the challenge of
sovereignty and, possibly with major extra effort, could be made egalitarian and
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just. However, the standard blockchain architecture has one global blockchain
shared by all agents, which stores all actions by all agents in a single linear
data structure; the entire blockchain is fully-replicated to all agents, and all ac-
tions of all agents are synchronized by a single (rotating) agent. These aspects
hamper the scalability of the standard blockchain architecture. Here we present
a fault-tolerant distributed transition system to realize digital social contracts.
The transition system is such in which each agent stores its sequentially-indexed
actions, as well as a partial order wrt. the sequentially-indexed actions of other
agents, that are parties to some contract.
1.3 Paper Structure
After providing, in Section 2, some preliminaries, in Section 3 we recall the def-
initions of the abstract model of computation for digital social contracts. Then,
in Section 4 we describe a, yet very abstract, distributed implementation of this
model. The full-fledged implementation model is described in Section 5, in which
we show a quite concrete, fault-tolerant implementation of social contracts.
2 Preliminaries
We assume a given finite set of agents V and a finite set of actions A. Each
agent is associated with a genuine (unique and singular) [11] identifier, which
is also a public key of a key-pair.1 Actions a ∈ A are identified with their
string representation. We expect agents to be realized by computer programs
operating on personal devices (e.g. smartphones) of people. Hence, we refer to
agents as “it” rather than as he or she.
We identify an agent v ∈ V with its genuine public identifier, and denote
by v(a) the result of agent v signing the action a ∈ A with the private key cor-
responding to v. We assume computational hardness of the public-key system,
namely that signatures of an agent with a given identifier cannot be produced
without possessing the private key corresponding to this identifier. To avoid
notational clutter we do not distinguish between finite mathematical entities
and their string representation. Identifying agents with their genuine identifiers
makes V totally ordered (by the numeric value of the identifier, namely the
public key) and hence allows defining tuples and Cartesian products indexed by
V . If t is a tuple indexed by V , then we use tv to refer to the v
th element of
t. We say that t′ = t except for t′v := x to mean that the tuple t
′ is obtained
from t by replacing its vth element by x. In particular, if tv is a sequence, then
we say that t′ = t, except for t′v := tv · m, to mean that t
′ is obtained from
t by appending m to the sequence tv. We denote by Λ the empty sequence,
and overload set notation viewing a sequence also as a set of its elements, in
case the elements are distinct (which is always the case here). Given a sequence
1We identify the set of agents V with the set of parties to the agreement. Extensions will
allow an agent to be a party to multiple agreements, and different agreements to have different
sets of agents as parties.
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s = x1, x2, . . . xn, a sequence s
′ is a prefix of s, s′  s, if s′ = x1, x2, . . . xk, for
some k ≤ n.
We employ a standard notion of a transition system:
Definition 1 (Transition System). A transition system TS = (S, s0, T ) consists
of a set of states S, an initial state s0 ∈ S, and a set of transitions T , T ⊆ S×S,
with (s, s′) ∈ T written as s −→ s′. The set s → ∗ = {sˆ | s −→ sˆ ∈ T } is the
outgoing transitions of s. A run of TS is a sequence of transitions r = s0 −→
s1 −→ · · · from the initial state.
Definition 2 (Mapping of Transition Systems, Deadlock-Freedom, Morphism,
Strict). Given two transition systems TS = (S, s0, T ) and TS
′ = (S′, s′0, T
′),
a function f : S → S′, where f(s0) = s′0, is a mapping of TS to TS
′. The
mapping is: deadlock free if for all s ∈ S, s→ ∗ is non-empty whenever f(s)→
∗ is non-empty; a morphism if f(s0) = s′0 and for all s −→ sˆ ∈ T we have
f(s) −→ f(sˆ) ∈ T ′; and strict if f(s→ ∗) = f(s)→ ∗.
That is, in a strict morphism the implementing process provides all the
transitions of the implemented process [6].
Definition 3 (Implementation). Given two transition systems TS = (S, s0, T )
and TS′ = (S′, s′0, T
′), and a mapping f from TS to TS′, then f is an imple-
mentation if:
1. For every TS′ transition s′1 −→ s
′
2 ∈ T
′, there is a sequence of TS transi-
tions s1 −→ . . . −→ sn ∈ T , n ≥ 2, such that f(s1) = s′1, f(sn) = s
′
2.
2. For every TS transition s1 −→ s2 ∈ T , either f(s1) = f(s2) or f(s1) −→
f(s2) ∈ T ′.
Observation 1. A strict morphism is an implementation.
Observation 2. Given two transition systems TS = (S, s0, T ) and TS
′ =
(S′, s′0, T
′), let f be a bijection f : S → S′, where f(s0) = s′0, and for all s, sˆ ∈ S
s −→ sˆ ∈ T iff f(s) −→ f(sˆ) ∈ T ′. Then both f and f−1 are implementations.
Observation 3. Let TS, TS′ and TS′′ be transition systems. If TS implements
TS′ and TS′ implements TS′′, then TS implements TS′′.
3 Abstract Model of Digital Social Contracts
Here we recall the formal model for digital social contracts.
A digital social contract consists of a set of agents, identified via public
keys, and connected via a reliable asynchronous network. All that agents can
do within a digital social contract is perform crypto-speech acts (henceforth,
acts), which are sequentially-indexed utterances, signed by the agent, and sent
as messages to all other agents that are parties to the contract, as well as receive
such messages. An example of an act is “I hereby transfer three blue coins to
5
Sue”. The digital social contract specifies the acts each party may take at any
state, and whether and how they respond to acts by other parties. For example,
a social contract regarding the blue currency may specify that I can take the
act about transferring three blue coins to Sue only in a state in which I in fact
have at least three blue coins.
In the following we recall the definition of digital social contracts as an
abstract transition system. For that, we define the states and the transitions.
The state of a digital social contract is composed of the states of each of
the agents participating in the contract. Due to the asynchronous nature of the
communication, we require that the acts of each agent be indexed sequentially
before being signed, so that any receiving agent can process them at the right
order. A sequence of signed sequentially-indexed acts is referred to as a history;
each agent maintains its own agent history. As agents are connected via an
asynchronous communication network, and any agent that takes a crypto-speech
act sends it to all other agents, then any act of one agent will eventually be
received correctly by all other agents. Hence, at any state of the computation,
the u-acts in the history of agent v must be a prefix of the u-acts in the history
of u. We call such such histories consistent. As the network is asynchronous,
it may deliver messages out of order. However, this can be easily addressed by
receiving and buffering out-of-order messages until the next message in order
arrives, and hence the formal model requires the acts of each agent in each
other agent’s history to be in order. Generally, the state of a computation of
the transition system consists of a set of histories, one for each agent, which are
pairwise consistent. The next section formalizes this informal description.
We assume a given set of actions A. In the following, actions performed
by an agent are first indexed and then signed. Signing an action by an agent
v makes the action non-repudiated by v. Signing sequentially-indexed actions
also makes the order of the actions of v non-repudiated by v. All that a party
to a digital social contract does, then, is perform a sequence of indexed crypto-
speech acts, resulting in a non-repudiated history of these acts, as well as receive
such acts performed by others. The result is the party’s history, defined next.
Definition 4 (v-act, History, Proper, Interleaving Equivalence). We refer to
m = v((i, a)), the result of signing an i-indexed action a ∈ A by agent v ∈ V
as a v-act, and let M denote the set of all acts by all v ∈ V . A history is a
finite sequence of acts h = m0,m1, . . .mn, n ∈ N , mj = vj((ij , aj)), j ∈ [n],
ij ∈ N , aj ∈ A, vj ∈ V . For given history h and agent v ∈ V , h[v] denotes
the subsequence of v-acts in h. A history is proper if for each v ∈ V , h[v] is
consecutively-indexed starting from index 0. The set of all proper histories is
denoted by H. Two histories h, h′ ∈ H are interleaving equivalent, h ∼= h′, if
h[v] = h′[v] for every v ∈ V .
In this paper we consider only proper histories. A ledger of a digital social
contract is an indexed tuple of histories of the parties to the contract. Ledgers
are the states of the social contracts transition system. Our key assumption is
that, in a ledger, each agent’s history is up-to-date about its own acts. Therefore,
for agent histories to be consistent with each other, the history of each agent
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can include at most a prefix (empty, partial or complete) of every other agent’s
acts. Of course it cannot include actions different from the one’s taken by the
other agent; but it can neither “guess” future agents the other agent might take.
Definition 5 (Ledger). A ledger l ∈ L := H|V | is a tuple of proper histories
indexed by the agents V , where lv denotes the v-indexed history in l, and lv[i]
denotes the ith element in this history, v ∈ V , 0 ≤ i < |lv|.
We extend the notation h[v], of restricting a history h to the subsequence of
v-acts, to ledgers. If the u-indexed history in l is lu = h, then define lu[v] := h[v],
namely the subsequence of v-acts in the u-indexed history in l.
Definition 6 (Consistent Histories, Ledger Diagonal, and Prefix). Given a
ledger l ∈ L, two agent histories lu, lv, for u, v ∈ V , are consistent if lu[v]  lv[v],
lv[u]  lu[u], and lu[w]  lv[w] or vice versa for every w 6= u, v ∈ V . Given a
ledger l, then l∗, the diagonal of l, is defined by l∗v := lv[v] for all v ∈ V . Given
two ledgers k, l ∈ L, then k  l if k∗v  l
∗
v for every v ∈ V .
One ledger is a prefix of a second if in the second ledger agents have done
exactly the same acts as in the first, and in the same order, and possibly some
more. As we assume that each agent is up-to-date about its own acts, the
diagonal contains the complete sequence of v-acts for each agent v ∈ V . Each
agent history in a ledger reflects the agent’s “subjective view” of what actions
were taken. The diagonal of a ledger contains the “objective truth”, as the
following observation shows.
Observation 4 (Consistency and the Diagonal). A ledger l ∈ L is consistent
if and only if lv[u]  l∗u for every v, u ∈ V .
Proof. Assume that lu, lv are pairwise-inconsistent for some u, v ∈ V . Then,
according to the definition of pairwise consistency, either lu and lv disagree
on the w-acts of a third agent w 6= u, v ∈ V , in which case lv[w] 6 l∗w or
lu[w] 6 l∗w. Or they disagree with each other, in which case lv[u] 6 lu[u] = l
∗
u,
or lu[v] 6 lv[v] = l∗v. In each of these cases, lv[u] 6 l
∗
u for some v, u ∈ V , which
proves the “if” direction.
Assume its not the case that lv[u]  l∗u for every v, u ∈ V . As l
∗
v = lv[v] by
definition, let u 6= v be agents for which lv[u] 6 l∗u. But lu[u] = l
∗
u by definition,
hence lv[u] 6 lu[u], hence l is not pairwise consistent, which proves the “only
if” direction.
We have defined the states of the transition system, and are now ready
to define the transitions themselves. Agent transitions, defined next, specify
how each agent updates its own history, with input and output acts. Agent
transitions are the building blocks of the social contract transition system. In
fact, the social contract transition system, defined in the following, is but a set
of agents updating a shared ledger, each according to its own transition system.
Definition 7 (Agent Transitions). A v-transition for v ∈ V has the form tv =
h −→ h ·m ∈ H×H, where m = u((|h[u]|, a)) for some u ∈ V and a ∈ A. Such a
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v-transition is Input if u 6= v and Output if u = v. Agent transitions are labeled
by label : H × H → V ×M, where label(tv) = (v,m), and may be presented
with their label, tv = h
(v,m)
−−−→ h ·m; in which case we say that (v,m) is enabled
in h. A set of v-transitions Tv is interleaving independent if h
(v,m)
−−−→ h ·m ∈ Tv
iff h′
(v,m)
−−−→ h′ ·m ∈ Tv for every h ∼= h
′ ∈ H.
Definition 8 (Ledger Transitions). A transition for l ∈ L has the form t =
l
(v,m)
−−−→ l′ ∈ T , where there exist an underlying v-transition tv = h
(v,m)
−−−→ h ·m
for some lv ∈ l. A set of transitions T is interleaving independent if for every
lv ∈ l the set of v-transitions is interleaving independent.
Definition 9 (Digital Social Contracts). A digital social contract SC = (S, T )
among a set of agents V is a transition system with ledgers as states S ⊆ L,
initial state l0 := Λ
|V |, and a set of interleaving independent transitions T ⊆
L × L such that t = l
(v,m)
−−−→ l′ ∈ T iff l and l′ are consistent and l′ = l except
for l′v := lv ·m.
Note that a digital social contract is uniquely determined by the v-transitions
of the parties v ∈ V to the contract.
Remark 1. Note that, by Definition 13, a transition of an agent depends only
on its history and, if input, also on the availability of the input. Furthermore, the
transition does not depend on the interleaving of actions in its history. Hence,
a social contract transition depends only on the state of the agent taking the
underlying agent transition and, if input, on the availability of that input. In
particular, if an agent v can take an Input transition in ledger l, then it could
still take such a transition in case v has done nothing while other agents have
taken additional actions, resulting in l1 for which l  l1. And if an agent v can
take an Output transition in a ledger l, then it could also take such a transition
in a prefix ledger l1  l, provided that the other agents have taken at least the
acts v knows about, and possibly nothing else, and provided l1 agrees with l on
v’s history. In other words, since an output act of v depends only on what v
knows, then v could still take this act if things v does not know about never
happened.
SC stands for (Abstract) Social Contract, and we also refer to SC as an
(abstract) transition system of a digital social contract, in contrast to the more
concrete implementation transition systems described below.
Definition 10 (Agent Liveness). A run r = l0 −→ l1 −→ · · · of a digital social
contract (S, T ) is v-live for v ∈ V if for every i ≥ 0 for which there is a v-
transition from state li, there is some j ≥ i for which a v-transition is taken
from state lj , namely lj −→ lj+1 is a v-transition. A run r satisfies agent liveness
if it is v-live for every v ∈ V .
This completes the definition of the abstract computational model of digital
social contracts.
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4 A Distributed Implementation of Digital So-
cial Contracts
As a step towards a fault-tolerant distributed transition system, we first define
a distributed transition system and prove that it is an implementation of digital
social contracts. Our distributed implementation is quite straightforward. In-
stead of having a notion of consistency that implies that each agent effectively
knows the diagonal of the ledger, the system is distributed so that each party to
the agreement learns of the diagonal incrementally and independently, through
message passing.
Transitions are as in abstract social contracts, but their context changes:
the system contains a communication network via which the agents interact, so
an Input v-transition indeed inputs a (v,m) message addressed to v from the
network, and an Output v-transition outputs (u,m) messages to the network
for all u 6= v.
We model a reliable asynchronous communication network among the agents
via an addressed message store:
Definition 11 (Addressed Message Store). A set M ⊆ AM := V × M is
referred to as an addressed message store. A v-act m is sent to u through M by
adding (u,m) to M , and is received by u removing it from M .
The network is the new component in a distributed social contract state:
Definition 12 (Distributed Ledger, Consistent). A distributed ledger is a pair
(l,M), where l ∈ L is a ledger and M ⊂ AM is an addressed message store.
Then (l,M) is consistent if l is consistent, and (u,m) ∈ M for a v-act m iff
m ∈ l∗[v] \ lu[v].
Namely, consistency in a distributed ledger not only refers to the pairwise
consistency of the agent histories in l, but also requires that the addressed
message storeM records precisely the entire “communication gap” from u to v,
namely include Output u-acts destined to v and not yet Input by v, recorded
as the difference between l∗[u] and lv[u], for every u 6= v ∈ V . Note that M is
uniquely determined by l in a consistent distributed ledger (l,M).
We are now ready to define the distributed transition system. It is similar to
the abstract transition system of digital social contracts, except that it employs
a communication network and the extended notion of consistency that comes
with it.
Definition 13 (Distributed Social Contract Transitions). Given a social con-
tract transition t = l
(v,m)
−−−→ l′, its corresponding distributed social contract
transition is t¯ = (l,M)
(v,m)
−−−→ (l′,M ′), M,M ′ ∈ AM, if one of the following
holds:
1. t is Input, (v,m) ∈M and M ′ :=M \ {(v,m)}.
2. t is Output, M ′ :=M ∪ {(u,m)) | ∀u 6= v ∈ V }.
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We can now define a distributed transition system corresponding to an ab-
stract transition system.
Definition 14 (Distributed Transition System for a Digital Social Contract).
Given an abstract transition system for a digital social contract SC = (S, T ), its
corresponding distributed transition system is DSC = (S¯, T¯ ), where S¯ is the set
of all distributed ledgers, initial state (l0, ∅), and transitions T¯ := {t¯ | t ∈ T }.
The basic idea of the proof that DSC implements SC is simple: Observe
that there is a one-to-one correspondence between SC runs and DSC runs. In
one direction, for each SC run take the run of the corresponding DSC. In the
other direction, for each DSC run, ignore the message store to obtain the SC
run.
Proposition 1 (DSC implements SC). Assume a given a digital social contract
SC = (S, T ) and its corresponding distributed transition system DSC = (S¯, T¯ ).
Consider the mapping f : S¯ −→ S that maps each S¯-state (l,M) to the S-state
l. Then f is an implementation of SC by DSC.
Proof sketch. The function f is a bijection since in every S¯ state (l,M), M is
uniquely determined by l, to include the difference between l∗ and the agent
histories in l. Hence f is a strict morphism.
In fact, SC and DSC implement each other, via f and f−1. It goes without
saying that an SC run satisfies agent liveness iff its corresponding DSC does
so as well.
5 A Fault-Tolerant Distributed Implementation
of Digital Social Contracts
Here we describe our fault-tolerant, distributed implementation of digital social
contracts. Before we describe our implementation, we discuss what are faulty
agents and what kind of fault tolerance we aim to achieve.
5.1 Faulty Agents and Fault Tolerance
We are interested in a distributed implementation that can withstand faulty
agents, which is amenable to formal analysis. Given the general setup described
above, we have two aims:
1. Fault Tolerance: Ensuring correct execution of the social contract de-
spite a fraction of the agents being faulty.
2. Fault Detection: Identifying and suspending faulty agents.
Next we develop the mathematical/computational infrastructure needed for the
first. Fault detection is in fact simpler but will be dealt with in a separate paper.
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From the perspective of the abstract social contracts transition system,
agents can have two types of faults: They may perform an act they are not
supposed to, violating safety, or they may stop performing any acts indefinitely,
even if they can, violating liveness. More formally, given an abstract social
contracts transition system SC = (S, T ) and sequence r = l0 −→ l1 · · · of social
contract states, namely ledgers, an agent v can exhibit two types of faults in r:
1. Safety Violation: t = li
(v,m)
−−−→ li+1 /∈ T for some i ≥ 0, namely t is a
v-transition not in T .
2. Liveness Violation: Stop taking transitions though its possible, namely
a v-transition can be taken from in lk, t = lk
(v,m)
−−−→ lk+1 ∈ T for some
k ≥ 0 and l ∈ L, but for all ti = li
(vi,mi)
−−−−−→ li+1, i ≥ k, vi 6= v.
Recall that in the distributed transition systemDSC, an Output v-transition
is effected by v sending its act m to all other agents. Hence, the distributed
transition system opens up the possibility for a third type of soundness vio-
lations, in which the act taken is safe, but the messages sent to other agents
are not as specified, in particular there could be missing correct messages or
spurious incorrect messages. Let DSC = (S¯, T¯ ) be a distributed transition
system corresponding to the abstract transition system SC = (S, T ), and let
r = (l0,M0) −→ (l1,M1) −→ · · · be a sequence of DSC states. An agent v can
exhibit the following additional fault in r:
1. Soundness Violation: (li,Mi)
(v,m)
−−−→ (li+1,Mi+1) /∈ T , even though
t = li
(v,m)
−−−→ li+1 ∈ T , where (l,M) is consistent but Mi+1 6= M :=
{(m,u) | u 6= v ∈ V }.
Double spend is the most notorious fault against which cryptocurrency pro-
tocols aim to withstand [3]. In it, an agent communicates to some other agents
one transaction, and to others another transaction; specifically two large pay-
ments taken from the same account, whose balance is insufficient to cover both.
A double spend is a special case of a double act, which is a soundness vio-
lation where two output v-transitions, t = (li,Mi)
(v,m)
−−−→ (li+1,M) ∈ T and
t′ = (li,Mi)
(v,m′)
−−−−→ (l′i+1,M
′) ∈ T , m 6= m′, and what v communicates to the
other agents aims to convince some of them that v has taken m and others that
v has taken m′, by M := {(m,u) | u 6= v ∈ V }, M ′ := {(m′, u) | u 6= v ∈ V },
Mi+1 ⊂M ∪M ′, but Mi+1 6⊂M and Mi+1 6⊂M ′.
Here we aim to address all three types of faults.
5.2 Our Implementation
To achieve fault tolerance, we follow the Byzantine-resilient broadcast of Bracha
(1987) [1], with some modifications. While the protocl of Bracha uses two rounds
of messages – an echo message, followed by a ready message – when using an
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interleaving-independent transition system, a single message is enough for a safe
broadcast. It does not guarantee consensus over an action of a Byzantine agent,
but it does guarantee that only the history of the Byzantine agent will be affected
from his attack, as we show in this section. To realize this broadcast protocol,
we add a special ratification message of the form r = v(ratify(m)) (similar to
Bracha’s echo message), where v ∈ V , m ∈ M is an act and ratify ∈ A is a
reserved action. Denote the set of all ratification messages by R.
An agent receiving a ratify message forwards it to all other agents, since
Byzantine agents may deliberately send their ratification only to some agents.
This makes the message overhead of this protocol higher than that of Bracha
(O(n3) instead of O(n2)). We present the protocol as is for simplification, then
discuss possible optimizations towards the end of this section.
Definition 15 (Fault-Tolerant Distributed Ledger). A fault-tolerant distributed
ledger is a triple (l, R,M), where l ∈ L is a ledger, R ⊂ R|V | is a V -indexed
tuple of sets of ratifications, and M ⊂ AM is an addressed message store.
The basic idea of Byzantine-resilient broadcast is that a message is con-
sidered final if sufficiently many agents ratify it. What is “sufficiently many”
depends on how many faulty (Byzantine) agents are there. As the key challenge
is double acts, and we assume that non-faulty agents do not ratify two com-
peting acts, we must require sufficiently many ratification so that, under this
assumption, no two competing acts will ever get finalized.
Hence, we assume some bound 0 ≤ σ < 1 on the fraction of faulty parties to
the contract. We then employ a δ-supermajority, δ ≥ σ2 , with which non-faulty
agents may conclude whether a v-act is final despite v or other agents being
faulty.
Definition 16 (δ-supermajority). Given 0 ≤ δ < 12 , a set of agents U ⊆ V is a
δ-supermajority if |U||V | >
1
2 + δ.
Definition 17 (Finality). Assume 0 ≤ δ < 12 , a set of ratifications R ⊂ R,
and an act m ∈ M. Then an agent v ratifies m given R if v(ratify(m)) ∈ R.
Let Ratify(m,R) := {v | v ratifies m given R}. Then m is finalized given R if
|Ratify(m,R)|/|V | > 12 + δ. The final subledger of l induced by R, finalizedR(l),
is the maximal ledger l′  l in which every m ∈ l′ is finalized by R. We also
define Evidence(R,m) := {r | r = v(ratify(m)) ∈ R, v ∈ V }
Observation 5. Assume δ ≥ σ2 , two v-acts m1 and m2, with same index, and
a set of ratification R. If no more than σ|V | agents ratify both m1 and m2, then
at most one of m1 and m2 is finalized by R.
Proof. By a counting argument.
Definition 18 (Fault-Tolerant Distributed Transition). Given 0 ≤ δ < 12 and
a distributed transition t¯ = (l,M)
(v,m)
−−−→ (l′,M ′), l, l′ ∈ L, M,M ′ ∈ AM,
its corresponding fault-tolerant distributed transition is tˆ = (l, R,M)
(v,m)
−−−→
(l′, R,M ′), where R ⊂ R|V | and if t is Input then m is finalized by Rv.
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Note that the key difference from a distributed transition system is that an
agent v can only input a u-act m if v knows that m is final, namely that m is
finalized by v’s set of ratification Rv.
Definition 19 (Ratification Agent Transitions). Given 0 ≤ δ < 12 the set of
ratification transitions T r includes all transitions (l, R,M) −→ (l, R′,M ′) for all
v 6= u ∈ V , where (v,m) ∈M and one of the following holds:
1. Input Ratify: m = u(ratify(m′)), and
(a) if m /∈ Rv then M ′ := M \ {(v,m)} ∪ {(w,m) | ∀w 6= u, v ∈ V },
R′ = R except for R′v := Rv ∪ {m}
(b) else M ′ := M \ {(v,m)}, R′ = R.
2. Output Ratify: m = u((i, a)), (v,m) is enabled by lv, r := v(ratify(m)),
r /∈ Rv, R′v := Rv ∪ {r}, R
′ = R except for R′v, M
′ :=M ∪ {(w, r) | ∀w 6=
v ∈ V }.
Definition 20 (Fault-Tolerant Distributed Transition System for a Digital So-
cial Contract). Given a distributed transition system for a digital social contract
DSC = (S¯, T¯ ), its corresponding fault-tolerant distributed transition system is
FSC = (Sˆ, Tˆ ), where Sˆ is all fault-tolerant distributed ledgers, initial state
(l0, ∅|V |, ∅), and transitions Tˆ := T r ∪ {tˆ | t¯ ∈ T¯ }.
Proposition 2 (FSC implements SC). Assume a given abstract social contract
transition system SC, its corresponding distributed social contracts transition
system for DSC = (S¯, T¯ ), and its corresponding fault-tolerant distributed social
contract transition system FSC = (Sˆ, Tˆ ). Then FSC implements SC.
Proof Sketch. We define a mapping f from FSC states to SC states as follows:
f((l, R,M)) = finalizedR(l). Namely, f takes a fault-tolerant distributed ledger
and extracts from it the finalized ledger.
The implications of this are that:
1. A fault-tolerant Input transition is mapped to an abstract regular Input
transition, since m can be input only if final.
2. A fault-tolerant output transition is mapped to stutter. An OutputRatify
transition that finalizes m by crossing the supermajority of ratifications,
maps to the abstract Output transition that has been thus ratified and
finalized.
3. Agent liveness (and maybe an additional fairness requirement) ensures
that every correct fault-tolerant Output(m) transition will be mapped
eventually to the corresponding regular Output(m˜) transition.
This should be enough to convince of the first halt of the definition that FSC
implements SC. For the second half, map every SC Output transition labeled
(v,m) to the corresponding fault-tolerant Output transition, followed by suffi-
cient Output Ratify transitions, the last of which finalizesm and thus is mapped
back by f to the abstract Output transition.
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The message overhead of this protocol is O(n3) ratify messages per one act,
n = |V |, as in the worst case for each u-act, each of the the other n−1 receiving
agents will forward n− 1 ratifications of itself and of the other receiving agents
to all n− 1 receiving agents. The protocol can be optimized so that instead of
rebroadcasting ratifications, agents broadcast act finality when they know it. In
the expected case, all agents will independently know of the finality of an act by
the time they wish to take it as input, without help from each other, and hence
the expected message overhead is O(n2). But, in the face of faulty agents, an
agent who wishes to take an input act, which they have ratified but do not yet
know of its finality, can request the evidence for its finality from any other agent
who has testified for its finality. And such agents must exist given a bounded
fraction of faulty agents and a corresponding δ. We forgo the details, proof and
analysis of this optimization.
6 Outlook
We described a transition system that implements the abstract transition sys-
tem of digital social contracts as defined in [2] and recalled here. In particular,
we showed that our transition system indeed implements the abstract one, and
is fault-tolerant against a bounded number of faulty agents. Our implementa-
tion transition system is the basis upon which a virtual machine to run social
contracts can be built upon.
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